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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DEBORAH DEANNE LAFAVE
aka GRASSER
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43170
Ada County Case No.
CR-2014-17499

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Lafave failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either
by imposing concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with four years fixed, upon her
guilty pleas to two counts of grand theft, or by denying her Rule 35 motion for reduction
of her sentences?

Lafave Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Lafave pled guilty to two counts of grand theft and the district court imposed
concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with four years fixed. (R., pp.51-55.) Lafave
filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.56-58.) She also

1

filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which the district court denied.
(Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave; Memorandum Decision and
Order 1) Denying Rule 35 Motion; and 2) Granting Additional Credit for Time Served
(Augmentations).)
Lafave asserts her sentences are excessive in light of her mental health issues,
support from family and friends, and purported remorse. (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-6.) The
record supports the sentences imposed.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard
considering the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475
(2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the
fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. Id.
(citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)). Where a sentence is
within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear
abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the
appellant must show that the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the
facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable, however, if it
appears necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. Id.
The maximum prison sentence for grand theft is 14 years. I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a).
The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of 10 years, with four years
fixed, which fall well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.51-55.) At sentencing, the
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district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also
set forth its reasons for imposing Lafave’s sentences. (Tr., p.30, L.14 – p.34, L.15.)
The state submits that Lafave has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons
more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which
the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Lafave next asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35
motion for reduction of sentence, in light of her participation in programs while
incarcerated, concern for her parents, employment potential, continued family support,
and because she was continuing to take her mental health medications. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.6-8.) The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Lafave’s Rule 35 motion.
Rule 35 provides both that a district court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after
judgment and that a motion for reduction may be made within 120 days after judgment.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35
motion within a “reasonable time” after the expiration of the 120 days. State v.
Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 352, 825 P.2d 74, 75 (1992). If, however, the trial court fails
to rule upon the motion “within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day
period, the trial court loses jurisdiction.” Id. at 354, 825 P.2d at 77. In addition, it is the
movant’s responsibility to “precipitate action on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable
time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for the delay, to
avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction.” State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 619,
977 P.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186, 953 P.2d
624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998)); State v. Simpson, 131 Idaho 196, 197 n.2, 953 P.2d 636, 637
n.2 (Ct. App. 1998).
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Lafave filed her Rule 35 motion 117 days after judgment was entered. (R., p. 51;
8/4/15 Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave (Augmentation).) The
district court had a “reasonable time” to rule on the motion; however it failed to rule until
174 days after the motion was filed. (Memorandum Decision and Order 1) Denying Rule
35 Motion; and 2) Granting Additional Credit for Time Served (Augmentations).)
Because nothing in the record justifies such a lengthy delay, the court had no
jurisdiction, 292 days after the entry of judgment, to rule on the motion. The order
denying Lafave’s Rule 35 motion should be affirmed because the district court lost
jurisdiction, due to the passage of time, to rule on the motion.
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Lafave’s claim, Lafave has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. In its order denying Lafave’s Rule 35 motion, the
district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its decision and also
set forth in detail its reasons for denying Lafave’s motion. The state submits that Lafave
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the
district court’s Memorandum Decision and Order 1) Denying Rule 35 Motion; and 2)
Granting Additional Credit for Time Served, which the state adopts as its argument on
appeal. (Appendix B.)
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Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Lafave’s conviction and
sentence and the district court’s order denying Lafave’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of
sentence.
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2016.

_/s/_Lori A. Fleming ___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of March, 2016, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

5

APPENDIX A

STA TE OF IDAHO. vs. DEBORAH D. LAFAVE aka GRASSER
1 ~rtlcular r.olnt. And I think that she deserves allttte
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1

t of credit for that anyway.
She would like the Court to consider something
other than apriSO!l sentence. She understands that
prison's deflnlte~ on the table. She's hoping the Court
won't go that far. She's more than wtlllng to
participate In aretained jurisdiction If that's what the
Court would deem appropriate.
She's more hopeful, though, that the Court would
consider placing her on probation after some period of
time in the Ada County Jail as punishment.
Regarding the underlying sentence, Judge, with
the restitution figure being as significant as It Is,
we'd leave the Indeterminate ~rtion to the Court's
discretion. If the Court is Incl ned to enter a
sentence, we would ask that the State •• or that the
Court enter atwo-year fixed sentence and no more than
that and an Indeterminate sentence as long as the Court
would calculate it would take her to pay back the
restitution.
Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank riou, Mr. Lorello.
Ms. Grasser, before tie Court proceeds to
sentencing, you have the right to make any statement you
would like.
29
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1 your business.
2
You were highly trusted, and you used many
3 different forms of fraudulent behavior to support
4 yourself In away that your normal wages wouldn't have
5 permitted you to do.
6
I've read these letters from your husband and
7 other familymembers who are very supportive, seem to
8 tliink that you would thrive in an environment of
9 treatment and medlcaUon. All have asked for leniency on
10 your behalf.
11
rm aware that you, from the mental health
12 evaluation, lhat you have anumber of mental health
13 issues, Including btlar and anxiety disorder.
14
It Is difficult or me to gra1o how you can have
15 acrimlnogenlcrisk assessment one and be considered
16 onlh amoderate risk to reoffend when you havereoffended
17 Int ils way after •• and as going to prison for this same
18 offense In the state of Washington.
19
Your attorney has suggested that perhaps
20 probation or aperiod of retainjurisdiction would be
21 appropriate.
22
I've reviewed the factors In Idaho Code Section
23 19·2521 which control whr.thr.r thr. Court should consider
24 you for placement In the community or for placement in
25 prison.
31

DOCKET NO: 431. 70

Is there some statement you would like to make,
ma'am?
THI: DEFENDANT: The only statement I had is the
one I wrote out that you have acopy of.
THE COURT: All right. I've read that.
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. That's·· I wrote that
out before I knew It was going to be in the PSI, so ••
THE COURT: Arhing beyond that, ma'am?
THE DEFENDAN : No, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
Mr. Lorello, are you aware of any reason why the
Court cannot proceed to sentencing?
MR. LORELLO: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms, Grasser, on your gull~ plea to
these two felony charges of grand theft, I fin , ma'am,
lhat you are guilly.
What aggravates your conduct in this case,
ma'am, Is that you'd been previouslysentenced to prison
as an embezzler. From the presentence materials it
appears thatiou were responslble for taking on the order
of $130,000 rom aprior employer. Apparently in
Washington that wlll land 11 months In prison these days.
You served that sentence, you moved to Idaho and
got yourself In aposition where you got control or
ahlllty to Influence the handling of money and credit In
30

1
The first factor is whether there is an undue
2 risk that during aperiod of asuspended sentence of your
3 probation that you wlll commit another crime. I find
4 that that factor ls present In ~our case.
5
The next factor Is whet er you are Inneed of
6 correctional treatment that can be provided most
7 effectlvell by commitment to an Institution. I find that
8 that Is a actor in this case.
9
The next (actor ls whether alesser sentence
10 will depreciate the seriousness of your crime. I would
11 nnd that asentence of probation Inthis case would
12 significantly and seriously depreciate the seriousness of
13 your reoffense In thiscase inIdaho.
14
The next factor Is whether Imprisonment will
15 provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to you. And
16 I find that that Is afactor In this case. You will be
17 speclncally punished If I send you to prison In away
18 that you will not if I placed you on probation.
19
The next factor Is whether Imprisonment wlll
20 provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons inthe
21 community. You always hope that asentence has that
22 effect, but I don't know If there's any empirical
23 evidence that It has that effect, so I find that Is a
24 neutral factor as applied In this case.
25
And last factor is whether you are amultiple
32

KASEY REDLICH, CERTIFIED COURT REPORTER
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S TATE OF IDAHO VS. DEBORAH D, LAFA VE aka GRASSER

1 offender or a professional criminal. I don't know that I

1

2 could characterize you as aprofessional crlminal, but

DOCKET NO: 4 31 70

For that reason, I come to this decision, ma'am.

2 I feel -· find that asentence of imprisonment in your

3 you are amultiple embezzler from different employers,
4 and having been previously sentenced to setve aterm of
s Imprisonment has not deterred your conduct.
6
And so at the end of the day, ma'am, my most
7 important function of this Is protection of the public.
8 I have no confidence that the public Is going to be
9 protected If I again permit you to go Into the community.
10 And for that reason I don't feel that asentence of
11 probation would be appropriate, and I won't order
12 probation In your case.
13
Your counsel has suggested that I should
14 consider aperiod of retain Jurisdiction. We have a
15 number of rider programs. And you would either be
16 sentenced to a CAPP Rider or a traditional rlder. I
17 don't know. But In any event, you'll be back before this
18 Court probably with arecommendation of probation in
19 about six months. And I wouldn't give you probatron In
20 six months.
21
And so I think it would give you afalse
22 promise, false ho~e If I were to retain jurisdiction.
23 Because I would ave no Intention on this record of
24 admitting you back In the community alter only six months
25 In an Institution.
33
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1
State have any questions about the Court's
2 disposition?
3
MR. MEDEMA: No, Your Honor.
4
THE COURT: Mr. Lorello?
5
MR. LORELLO: Your Honor, was that afour plus
6 ten on both counts?
7
THE COURT: Concurrent.
8
MR. LORELLO: Concurrent. Thank you.
9
THE COURT: Yes.
10
Ms. Grasser, I advise 7oou, ma'am, that you have
11 the right to appeal •• eyes orward, ma'am.
12
THE DEFENDANT: Pardon me.
13
THE COURT: I advise you that you have the right
14 to appeal this Judgment and its terms. You have 42 days
15 from the written entry of this judgment to file that
16 appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court.
17
In that appeal you are entitled to be
18 represented by an attorney. If you cannot afford an
19 attorney, one will be appointed for ru at State exrinse
20 and as a needy person, the costs o that appeal wl I be
21 paid for by the State.
22
At this point, ma'am1 I remand you to the
23 custody of the Ada County Sheriff for delivery to the
24 proper agent of the state board of corrections in
25 execution of your service.

case Is a~ropriate. It will protect the publlc. It
will rovi eadequate deterrence to you. I would like to
thin that after you spend asi~nlftcant amount of time
In prison In Idaho you will thin very hard about
victimizin~ another employer in your career.
I wl enter aJudgment of conviction on both
counts. As to the first count, I will sentence you to
the custody of the state board of correction for aterm
of 14 years, consisting of four years fixed followed by
ten years Indeterminate.
As to the second count, I will Impose a
concurrent sentence of 14 years, consisting of four years
fixed followed by ten years indeterminate.
I will order that you pay the restitution that
you have agreed. I will order that you ~ay all of those
court costs and statutory assessments t at are authorized
by law in acase of this sort as to each of those counts.
Because of the magnitude of your restitution obligation,
I'm not golnr to order that you pay afine In this case.
We wil calculate and give you credit for the
time that rcu have served prior to today's sentencing.
I wil order that you have no contact with the
victim In this case or her business.

34

1
That's all I have for you, ma'am. Good luck to
2 you.
3
And I'll order reimbursement of $250 as part of
4 the assessment for the public defender's offKe.
Thank you.
5
6
7
(End of proceedings.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL OJSTRI

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF A.µA.

3
4

r,
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
6

Plaintiff,

7

8

Case No. CR-FE-2014-0017499

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER l) DENYING RULE 35
MOTION; AND 2) GRANTING
ADDITIONAL CREDIT FOR TIME
SERVED

9
10
11

12
13

DEBORAH DEANNE LAFAVE
aka GRASSER,
Defendant.

14

15

After Deborah Derume LaFave aka Grasser pleaded guilty to two counts of Grand Theft,

16

on April 8, 2015, the Court sentenced her to concurrent fourteen (14) year lem1s, with four (4)

17

years fixed. A Judgment of Conviction and Commitment was entered on April 9, 2015.

18

19
20

LaFavc; by and through counsel Michael Lojek, Ada County Deputy Public Defender,
timcly 1 filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave, with supporting evidence

and memorandum, on August 4, 2015. On August 5, October 14, November 9, December 8,

21
22

December 15, December 29, 2015, January 7, and January 15, 2016, LoFave filed additional

23

supporting documentation and iufonuution. The State filed an opposition to the motion for

24

leniency on September 22, 2015. The Court has reviewed all of these sul>missiorss. LuFaw

25

1 "Motions to correct or modify

sentence under this rule must be filed within 120 days of the entry of the judgment

imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction...." !.C.R. 35(b).
26

~

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 1) DENYING RULE 35 MOTION; AND 2)
GRANTING ADDITIONAL CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED - PAGE 1
Aug. p.80

1

...........

J
2

3

requests leniency al\d moves the Cou11 lo
reduce her fixed sentence to no more than
two

(2)
)'Cars and her indeterminate sc11tence to no
more than twelve (12) years. LaFave also
moves thi~
court to nmcnd or correct the judgment to
rcOec:I credit for time served in the a11101111I
of one
hundred and six (106) days.

5
<,
7

II

ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Reconsider
"A Ruic 35 motion essentially is a plea for
leniency that may he granted
imposed was, for any rcoson, unduly seve
re. Srate

9

10
i.l

12

13
14

15

18
19
20

23

24
25

26

if the sentence

v. McCulloch, 133 Idaho 351, 352, 986 P.2d

1017, 1018 (Ct.App.1999); State v. Puga,
114 ldaho 117,118,753 P.2d 1263, 1264
(Ct.App.1987). The decision wht:thcr to redu
ce a lcg11l sentence is commilled to the discr
etion of
the sentencing court. S/(l{e \', Jwguirrr., 145
Idaho 820, 822, 186 P.3<1676,678 (Ct./\pp.2
008).
The juoge may consider fuels presented at
the orieinal sentencing as well as any new
infonnalion
conceming the defendant's rchobilitntivc
progress in conlincmcnt. Puga, 1M ldnho
nt 118, 7S3
l'.2d al 1264; Stale 1•. 'f'orres, 107 Idaho 895,
898, 693 P.2d I097, 1100 (Ct.App. 1984)."
State v.
Martinez, 154 ldnho 940,948,303 l'.Jd 627,
63S (Ct. App. 2013).
For purposes of 1mnlyzing a sentence, n cour
l analyzes the entire sentence, both fixed
and
indetcnn!nntc. Stale v. H11{/i11an, 144 Idah
o 20 I, 202, IS9 P.Jd 838, 839 (2007); State
v. Olii•er,
144 ldaho 722, 726, l'/0 P.'.\d 387,391 (200
7). The court presumes that the lix1:d port
ion of the
sentcnco will be the deftmdRnt's probable
term of confinement. Oliver, 144 Idaho at
726 (dting
Stale v. 1hM110, 132 ldaho 888, 980 P.2d
552 ( l 999)). As a general rule, "tt senlcnce
fixed
within the limits pl'escribed by statute ordi
narily will not be consiclered an abuse of
cliscr~tion by
the trial con rt." Stare v. Nice, I03 fdaho
89, 90, 645 P.2d '.123, 324 (1982).

I

I

i
i

I,

I

. For a sentence to be considered rcnsonah
le, at the time of sentencing the com! mus
t tnke

i
l1

MEMORANDUM l)ECISION AND ORD
ER 1) DENYING RULE 35 MOTCON
; AND 2)
GRANTING ADnITIONAL CREDIT FOR
TIME SERV 1m - PAGE l

•l

l:

.• i'

fI
i i

Aug.p.81

2

·1

,.

/
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1

into consideration lhe objectives of sentencing: whether confinement i!. necessa
ry to accomplish

2

the objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the rc!ated goals

3

rehabilitation. or retribution applicable to lhe case. Stale v. Toohill, 103 Idaho
565, 568, 650

of deterrence,

P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). This requires a court lo focus on the nature of
the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. State
v, Reinke. 103 Idaho
6
7

8

771,772,653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982).
LaFavc argues that the sentence was excessive considering any view of the evidenc
e
under any view of the evjdence. The Court does not agree. The Court impos~
J concurrent

9

10
11

sentences within the limits of the statute. The Court did not impose consecu
tive sentences.
In any sentencing, the primary focus begins with a concern for protection of

the public. In

12

1his case, LaFave pled guilty to Counts I and U, Grand Tlu::fl. For each count
the Court imposed

13

an aggregate term of fourteen (14) years, with a minimum period of confinement

14

followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed ten
years. The

15

penalty for this offense is fourteen years. The fixed portion of a se-J1tence impose
d under the

16

Unified Sentencing Act i~ t~eated as the li;:rrn of confinement for sentence revic.:w

of four years,
mllximu m

purposes. Stale

v. Huyes, 123 Idaho 26, ?,7, 843 P.2d 675, 676 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court finds
that a four year
18

fixed sentence fur Grand Theft is entirely appropriate considering LaFave's prior

criminal

l!)

20

history, the facts of this crime, and all mitigating foctors such as her mental

health issues, any

21

remorse, and her family and other support. Furthermore, the Court considered
the entirety

22

sentence, including any indctenninate time.

23

of the

1n arriving at this sentence, the Conrt considered LaFave 's character
and any mitigat

iug

24

or aggravating factors. The Court, however, found there were several aggrava
ting factors in this

25

case - suggesting the need for this sentence. In particular, it is clear that
LaFaw needs to be

26

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER l) DENYING RULE 3S MOTIO
N; AND 2)
GRANTING ADDITIONAL CREDI1' FOR TIME SERVED - PAGE 3
Aug. p.82

3

deterred from future crimes. The Court's decision focused on rchabiliMion,
retribution and the
2

protection of society. The facts of this crime and her criminal history sugges
ted

3

sentence ln order to properly rehabilitate her.

the nee<I for this

This was her second felony, which includes a previous conviction of eight
(8) counts or
5

felony Theft in Wnshi11gton in 2007, with striking similarities to the present

6

a position of1rust in a Wnshington r.ompany she wos employed uy. LaFavc
took advantoge of the

7

owner's trust to ~teal more than $130,000. Once convicted, LaFave only
served

8
9

her twenty -two (22) month prison senti.:nce. LaFnve's misdemeanor record

eleven (J l) of

includes Driving

\ll\dcr the Influence (2010) and Driving with License Sltspended or Revoke

d (20 I0).

JO

l1

case. J.nl'ave goincd

In the present case, Lftl~nvc was hired by Perfominnce Systems, Inc.,

where she gained

12

her employer's tnist quir.kly. nnsed on L11F1we's actions she was given

13

responsibilities within the company, including m1thorily to use the compa
ny credit cnrd.

addilional tasks and
Within a

short nmount of time, L11Fave was promoted from nccounts payable suppor
t lo Human Resources
15

Manager/Payables Support. Eventually, J.11F1wc. started to use the compan
y credit curd

16

personnl use, opened n Cupitnl One credit card in the owner's nome ond
overpaid on her vacation

n

and holiday µay. In a six month time period LaF:we's thefts resulted in
o Joss of more than

10

$40,000 to her employer. In the Court's view, the sentences were entirely
appropriate and

19

20
21
22
23

for hi.:r

rcosonablc. In determining to imposo a sentence of imp1isunmcnt, thi.:
coiirt carefully reviewed
tht: fai.:tors set forth In Idaho Code § 19-2521 ond recited on the record
al sentencing why these
factors mi litatcd in favor of a sentence of imprisu111m:11t.
Where the sentence Is not excessive when pronounced, the· dcfcnd1111t

must show thot it is

24

excessive in view of new or additionnl evidence presented with the motion
for rc<luctlo11. State v.

25

Hernandez, 121 Idaho I 14, I I7, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Ct. Ap~. 1991 ). The Court
has reviewed

26

MEMO RAND UM DECJS ION AND ORDI.;R 1) DENYING
IWLE 35 MOTIO Ni ANll 2)
GRAN TING ADDIT IONAi , CREDIT FOR TIME SERV£Dl'AGE 4
Aug.r.83

4

LoFnve's letters dated June 9, 201S, June 30, July 2,
July

l

2

8, July ?.O, July 22, September 30,

November, 3, December 21 , 20 IS, January 2 and Janua
ry 11,

2016, the undntcd lelier from her

3

aunt, Nadeen Clark, the fone 16, 2015 letter from her
parents. The Coml has reviewed the rDOC

I,

progress notes. The Court recognizes that LaFnve
has the continued

5

Coul't recognizes that L11Favc is trying to make the
bcsl of her time in prison by

6

to cngago in trentmcnl, 11nd making plnns to lcucl H

9

lO
ll

l .?.

13

16
1 ·1
18

)9

would like to be uble 10 help out

at home. However, none of this persuades the Cour
t thnt the original sentence was excessive.
As an exercise of discretion, the Comt will dcnr <he

motion to reduce the sentence 11s

requested by LaFave.
B. Credit for Time Servcil
LnFnvc requests a correction for credit for time
served. Judgine11t wns entered against

LnFnve on April 9, 7.015, in a Judgment of Conviction
nnd
l!>

working, seeking

prod\1ctive life when she is relensed. The

Court recognizes that her pc1rents have health issue
s und LaFavc
8

support of her family. The

Commitment. Therein, LuFnve wns

given credit for lime served in the amount of ninety-sev
en (97) days. Lntlnvc n~serts she was
mrestcd in Kelso, \Vc1shington on December 23, 2014
, pursuant to an arrest wnrranl related to the
underlying crime in this action. The Court has confi
nned that this is correct one\ will amend the
Judgment of Conviction to provide for credit of 106
days (December 23, 20 14 to April 9, 2015).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated this

~

day of JMuary, 2016.
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~ l l ~ -· - ~

23

n,~trict Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAI[,JNG

1
2

I hereby certify that on tho

21 day of Janunry, 2016, I mailed (served)

ti

true .ind correct

copy of the within inslnnnen! to:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

s VIA EMAIL

'/

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENlJHR'8 OFFICE
VIAEMAJL
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H
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16
17
18
19
20

21
22
?.3

?.I\

MEMOlUNDU M DECISION AND ORDEH 1) DENYING RULE 3~
MOTIO N; AND 2)
GRANTING ADDITIONAL CREU11' FORTI MESER VF.D- l'AGF.
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